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Campbell and McCrae: Comments

COMMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT-PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE THRESHOLD
AGENCY DETERMINATION THAT AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Is NOT REQUIRED; TESTS FOR ACTIONS CONSTITUTING "MAJOR
FEDERAL ACTION SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF THE

HUMAN ENVIRONMENT".

Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.

1973).
In Rucker v. Willis,' the defendant owned a tract of beach
property in North Carolina. He petitioned the United States
Army Corps of Engineers 2 for a permit' allowing him to construct
two commercial fishing piers and to excavate a boat basin and an

access channel. 4 Copies of the required notice of application 5 were
forwarded to appropriate federal, state and local agencies, environmental groups, private organizations and individuals.6 One
1. 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Corps.
3. The Corps has authority to grant permits such as the one in question under the
provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970),
which provides:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress,
to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited;
and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier,
dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any
port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the
United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have
been established, except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate
or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or
capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge,
or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the
Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
4. One pier, over 1,000 feet long, was to be constructed in the Atlantic; the second
pier and the marina were to be constructed in the adjacent sound. Rucker v. Willis, 358
F. Supp. 425, 426 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
5. Public notice is required under Eng'r Reg. No. 1145-2-303. 358 F. Supp. at 426.
6. Among those receiving notice were the regional Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife, the regional Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, the regional field representative of
the Secretary of the Interior, all components of the Department of the Interior, the regional Shellfish Consultant of the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the regional director of the National Park Service, the Southeastern
Archeological Center of the Park Service, various officials of the Corps, the North Carolina
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federal agency suggested a modification, which was later made an
integral part of the permit, 7 but no other governmental agency
commented adversely on the project. The Environmental Protection Agency,' responsible for water quality, did not respond.'
.Numerous adverse responses, however, were received from
individuals and private organizations. The Corps' normal procedure in such a case is to forward all criticisms to the agency with
the greatest competence in evaluating the issue presented. That
agency then informs the Corps of its findings and recommendations, which the Corps considers in making its final determination. In Rucker, however, since the majority of agencies with
relevant expertise had already responded and in so doing had
"substantially rebutted most"' 0 of the adverse comments, the
Corps decided not to forward the objections. The district engineer
then found, without issuing written findings to substantiate his
conclusions, that no Environmental Impact Statement" was reDepartment of Natural and Economic Resources, the Sierra Club, the Conservation Council of North Carolina, the town of Emerald Isle, the County Commissioners of Carteret
County, and over 150 other groups, agencies, and individuals. 484 F.2d at 160.
7. The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife suggested the modification to "protect
this valuable estuarine resource." Id. at 161.
8. Hereinafter referred to as the EPA.
9. 358 F. Supp. at 426.27.
10. 484 F.2d at 162.
11. The Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter referred to as the EIS) is the
"action-forcing" provision referred to by section 102(2)(C) (see note 16 infra) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). It need not be
an exhaustive collection of scientific facts. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 352 F.
Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F.
Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972). It must, however, "at a minimum, contain such information
as will alert the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, the public, and, indeed,
the Congress to all known possible environmental consequences of proposed agency action." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 757 (E.D.
Ark. 1971). See also Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973),
aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973). The EIS is not merely an exercise in "product justification" but is rather a working paper, an essential input into agency decisions concerning
the extent of federal action. Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 1971); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Volunteering to file a statement at some future time is not sufficient, Arlington Coalition v. Volpe,
458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), because NEPA "does not authorize defendants to meet
their responsibilities by locking the barn door after the horses are stolen." Lathan v.
Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262, 266 (W.D. Wash. 1972). See also Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 353
F. Supp. 14 (D. Hawaii 1972). For further analysis of what is required and how courts
review EIS's, see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Tex. 1973). See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRrs (1973).
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quired. 2 Consequently, on April 9, 1973, the Corps issued the
permit.
The plaintiffs, adjoining landowners, brought an action to
temporarily restrain and preliminarily enjoin the proposed project, alleging that it would significantly affect the environment
and would cause them irreparable injury. The essence of their
claim was that the co-defendant Corps failed to file an EIS as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act.13 They contended that the permit was therefore illegally issued. The district
court found neither an abuse of discretion nor sufficient federal
involvement to constitute major federal action and hence denied
plaintiffs' motions.14 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the Corps' assessment of the potential environmental impact of the proposed project was not arbitrary and
that, in any event, the project was not a major federal action
significantly affecting the environment."
When a proposed action or proposal for legislation is a
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment,"'" NEPA requires preparation of an EIS by
12. 484 F.2d at 162; see note 25 infra.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970) (hereinafter referred to as NEPA). Further
references to specific code sections of NEPA will be to the uncodified section designations
of Title I rather than U.S.C. sections; see note 11 suprafor discussion of EIS's.
14. 358 F. Supp. at 425.
15. 484 F.2d at 158 (2-1 decision).
16. NEPA, § 102(2)(C) provides as follows:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall(C)
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environment impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are
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the agency directly responsible for the proposed project.' 7 This
statement is then utilized in evaluating the environmental costs
of the project. Conversely, if the administrator finds that the
federal action is not major or that it does not significantly affect
the environment, there is no requirement that an EIS be filed.
To make its assessment of the potential environmental consequences of a proposed project, the Corps, upon receipt of an
application, appoints an officer to evaluate the project. This officer solicits comments from those organizations, both public and
private, that possess expertise in areas that may be affected by
the proposed project. He then evaluates the responses in light of
the information gained by his personal investigation. If he determines that an EIS is required, he is responsible for its preparation. If, however, he determines that the proposed action involves
no major federal participation or that it would not significantly
affect the environment, previous case law requires that he must
state the rationale behind his conclusion. 8 In Rucker, however,
no such explanation was made, and the case effectively overrules
the procedural commands of previous Fourth Circuit cases.' 9 In
addition, the views of the two-man majority in Rucker appear to
be contrary to those of four other members of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.20 While it is apparent that the substantive decision reached in Rucker was correct, it is here contended that the procedural requirements of the Act were not followed.
The factual situation in Rucker presented the Corps with two
distinct statutory duties: a discretionary duty concerning issuance of the permit 2' and a mandatory duty to consider the enviauthorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be
made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality
and to the public . . . . and shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review processes ....
17. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

18. See notes 22-52 and accompanying text infra.
19. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 451

F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); see text accompanying notes 39-43 infra.
20. Judge Craven in Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973), Judges Russell
and Field in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973), and Judge

Winter in Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), have taken positions contrary to
that of the majority in Rucker. Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judge Widener, the majority
in Rucker, had joined the opinions in Ely and Appalachian Power respectively.
21. See note 3 supra.
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ronmental impact of the proposal. 22 The Corps evaluated the permit application, found it to be in order and issued the permit,
properly complying with its discretionary duty. Its mandatory
duty was not so clearly discharged, however. For example, since
the project required the dredging of an access channel,2 water
quality degradation was possible. Yet there was no response from
the EPA, the only agency with expertise in the matter of water
quality. The Corps district engineer, the responsible officer in this
case, did not, however, think it necessary to explain his decision
not to require an EIS.
In addition, the district engineer's decision was "based on
the fact that no Federal, State or local agencies certified to him
that the permit would have a significant and adverse effect on the
human environment. ' ' 24 This statement conceded that there was
no consideration of water quality anywhere in the record and
implies that the Corps did not make a detailed investigation of
its own but rather relied excessively on the evaluations of others.
To reach its conclusion, the reviewing court was therefore required to make a double inference: first, that the EPA failed to
respond only because it found that there would be no degradation
of water quality and second, that since there was no such degradation, the Corps had determined that the proposed project
2
would not significantly affect the environment.
The provisions of NEPA are mandatory and create procedures with which agencies must comply. 26 A few early district
court decisions held that the procedural requirements of the Act
were discretionary and did not create affirmative duties binding
on federal agencies. 21 It is now well recognized, however, that
22. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1972);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. See note 4 supra.

24. 358 F. Supp. at 429.

25. 484 F.2d at 159 n.2 states in part:
The district engineer issued no written findings. Neither did he specifically
state that an impact statement was not necessary. From the issuance of the
permit, however, the necessary inference is a finding that no impact statement
was necessary, since the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), and the applicable
regulation, 37 Fed. Reg. 2525 (Feb. 2, 1972), para. 11(c), both require a statement if their conditions are met, but do not require a negative finding or statement.
26. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
27. New York v. Department of the Army, 3 ENvm. REP. 1947 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 21,
1972); Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th
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these decisions were in error; one court has emphasized that "the
very purpose of NEPA was to tell federal agencies that environmental protection is as much a part of their responsibility as is
protection and promotion of the industries they regulate.12 Sec-

tion 102(2)(C) requires that an EIS be prepared for any proposed
project that is a major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the environment.2 9 The initial determination of
Cir. 1971); Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 ENVIR. REP. 1082 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 29, 1970).
28. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinatink Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The Congressional delineation of the scope of national environmental policy expressed in § 101 of NEPA "is as broad as the mind can conceive." First Nat'l Bank v.
Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1377 (7th Cir. 1973). However, without an enforcement section,
which was absent from the original bill, such a declaration would have been ineffective.
S. 1075, 115 CONG. REc. 3701 (1969). After extensive Senate hearings, the bill was amended
to require that all agencies include in every recommendation or report on a major federal
action a "finding" by the responsible official that he had considered the environmental
consequences. 115 CONG. REc. 19008 (1969). The House, in deleting the "finding" provision, passed a much weaker version which went to the joint conference committee, which
made two significant compromises. The language requiring a "detailed statement" was
agreed upon to give the bill "action-forcing" powers but only at the expense of the declaration that all persons had a "right" to a healthful environment. This language was compromised to "should enjoy" a healthful environment. See generally Note, Evolving Judicial
StandardsUnder the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska
Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592 (1972).
29. The Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality (quoted at note 32 infra)
state that each agency of the federal government shall comply with the requirements of
NEPA unless existing law applicable to the agency's operations expressly prohibits compliance or makes compliance impossible. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). This view of the nature
of the Act is supported by the legislative history:
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency of the
Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in . . . [section
102(2)(C)] unless the existing law applicable to such agency's operations does
not make compliance possible .

. .

. Thus, it is the intent of the conferees that

the provision "to the fullest extent possible" shall not be used by any Federal
agency as a means to avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section
102. Rather. . . no agency shall seek to construe its existing statutory authorizations in a manner designed to avoid compliance.
115 CONG. REc. 40418 (1969).
Prohibitions in existing laws can, in specific instances, enable an agency to effectuate
programs of significance without complying with NEPA requirements. For instance, in
United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court held that a federal district
court lacks jurisdiction to suspend an emergency 2.5 percent surcharge on goods being
shipped for recycling, even though the ICC failbd to prepare an EIS. NEPA did not act
to repeal section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which vests the ICC with the
exclusive power to suspend rates. The activity of the ICC is, however, distinguishable from
general agency activity since actions under section 15(7) have been held to be nonreviewable in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658 (1963). See also Alabama Gas
Corp. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1973); Nielson v. Seaborg, 348 F. Supp. 1369,
1372 (D. Utah 1972). Similarly, judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
is foreclosed "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a contrary legisla-
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whether the proposed project is such an action is left to the discretion of the responsible agency.30
NEPA establishes, as an integral part of the basic mandate
of federal agencies, 31 the need to consider environmental matters"
tive intent." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). Judicial review
has never been foreclosed with NEPA. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 299 (8th Cir. 1972); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
356 F. Supp. 14, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
30. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n
v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe,
345 F. Supp. 1167, 1170-71 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D.
Wis. 1971); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D.Me. 1971).
The Corps' own regulations provide:
Regulatory permits. In evaluating permit applications, the District Engineer
will carefully evaluate the impact on the environment of the proposed action
considering environmental information provided by the applicant, all advice
received from Federal, State and local agencies, and comments of the public. If
the District Engineer believes that granting the permit may be warranted but
could lead to significant environmental degradation, an environmental statement will be prepared.
37 Fed. Reg. 2525, para. 11(c) (1972).
31. NEPA, § 101(b) provides as follows:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
32. The Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724
(1971) provide:
5. Actions included. The following criteria will be employed by agencies
in deciding whether a proposed action requires the preparation of an environmental statement: (a) "Actions" include but are not limited to: (i) Recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including that for appropriations. The requirement for following the section 102(2)(C) procedure as elaborated in these guidelines applies to the (i) agency recommendations on their own
proposals for legislation and (ii) agency reports on legislation initiated else-
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at every distinct and comprehensive stage' of the review process.
The primary and non-delegable34 responsibility for fulfilling that
function lies with the controlling agency, here the Corps.3 5 One
court has held that an agency "has abdicated a significant part
of its responsibility"36 if it fails to conduct its own investigation
and substitutes the statement of others for the one it was to
prepare. In such a situation the controlling agency would appear
content:
to collate the comments of other federal agencies, its own staff,
and intervenors and once again to act as an umpire. The danger
of this procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential,
if not the likelihood, that the
applicant's statement will be upon
7
self-serving assumptions.
where. (In the latter case only the agency which has primary responsibility for
the subject matter involved will prepare an environmental statement.) The
Office of Management and Budget will supplement these general guidelines
with specific instructions relating to the way in which the section 102(2)(C)
procedure fits into its legislative clearance process; (ii) Projects and continuing
activities: directly undertaken by Federal agencies; supported in whole or in
part through Federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assistance; involving a Federal lease, permit, license, certificate or other
entitlement for use; (iii) Policy, regulations, and procedure-making. (b) The
statutory clause "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall,
cumulative impact of the action proposed (and of further actions contemplated). Such actions may be localized in their impact, but if there is potential
that the environment may be significantly affected, the statement is to be
prepared. Proposed actions, the environmental impact of which is likely to be
highly controversial, should be covered in all cases . . . . The lead agency
should prepare an environmental statement if it is reasonable to anticipate a
cumulatively significant impact on the environment from Federal action.
33. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1971). Also, "NEPA requires more than full disclosure of environmental consequences and
project alternatives; NEPA requires full consideration of the same in agency decision
making." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 286
(E.D.N.C. 1973).
34. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 352-53 (8th Cir.
1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 356 F. Supp. 14, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
City of N.Y. v, United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 158-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
35. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1972); Conservation Soc'y of
S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 632 (D. Vt. 1973). But cf Sierra
Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 122 (D. Alas. 1971).
36. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. Id. Another court has criticized a responsible agency for having done "virtually
nothing except to take the promoter's work sheet at face value and endorse it without

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss1/6

8

Campbell and McCrae: Comments

1974]

NEPA

These precedents demonstrate that, in Rucker, the Corps should
have made its own detailed investigation of the possible environ38
mental consequences of the proposed activity.
The responsible agency must not only complete the initial
assessment of a particular project but must also explain its reasoning if it has determined that an EIS need not be prepared. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was one of the first courts
to require that the rationale of an agency decision be articulated.
In Ely v. Velde, 39 it held that the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, in approving the use of federal funds for the construction of a prison facility in a scenic and historic area of Virginia, had to comply with the requirements of NEPA. The court
said that one such requirement was that:
The agency must not only observe the prescribed procedural
requirements and actually take account of the factors specified,
but it must also make a sufficiently detailed disclosure so that

in the event of a later challenge to the agency's procedure, the
courts will not be left to guess whether the requirements of...
NEPA have been obeyed."
Less than six months prior to Rucker, the Fourth Circuit, in

AppalachianPower Co. v. EPA,4 held that NEPA did not require

the EPA to prepare an EIS in support of agency approval of a
state's Clean Air Act" implementation plans. The court did, however, require that the record of expert views and opinions, the
technological data, and other relevant material on which the
independent investigation." Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877,
880 (D. Ore. 1971). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said:
[W]e must decide whether the Commission has correctly discharged its duties,
including the proper fulfillment of its planning function in deciding that the
"licensing of the project would be in the overall public interest." The Commission must see to it that the record is complete. The Commission has an affirmative duty to inquire into and consider all relevant facts.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
It is not clear whether this general requirement applies to the EPA. See generally
Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973); Buckeye Power, Inc. v.
EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 447 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
38. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
39. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
40. Id. at 1138 (emphasis added).
41. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5c (1972).
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administrator himself had acted, i.e., the record as a whole, be
presented for review, stating:
Courts require that administrative agencies "articulate the
criteria" employed in reaching their result and are no longer
content with bare administrative ipse dixits based on supposed
administrative expertise. While the agency may have discretion
to decide, "[d]iscretion to decide does not include a right to act
perfunctorily or arbitrarily"; and, in order for a Court to make
a critical evaluation of the agency's action and to determine
whether it acted "perfunctorily or arbitrarily," the agency must
in its decision "explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis,
and its reasoning." And, in making its review, the Court must
have, not merely that full articulation of the agency's reasoning,
but it must also have "the whole record" on which the agency
acted . .

..

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is not the only court
that adheres to this view. In a series of decisions, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has established essentially
the same criteria. In a case in which an agency decided that an
EIS was unnecessary, the court stated that "the minimum requirement for compliance with the 'action-forcing' provisions of
NEPA is for the agency to supply a statement of reasons why it
believes that an impact statement is unnecessary."" The court
also stated that the administrative officers should "articulate the
standards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions
in as much detail as possible,"45 "including an appraisal of the
decision's environmental effects." 4 This appraisal is required
because "a statement of reasons

. . .

will insure that the agency

has given adequate consideration to the problem and that it understood the statutory standard.

' 47

43. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
44. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added).
45. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
46. Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 4 ENvmR. REP. 2063 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 6, 1973).
47. Scientist's Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th
Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir.
1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78, 97 (D. Kan. 1973); Durnfurd
v. Ruckelshaus, 5 ENVIR. REP.1007 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 12, 1972); Town of Groton v. Laird,
353 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D. Conn. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Wis.
1971); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Me. 1971). But cf.
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While the aforementioned cases involved situations analogous to that in Rucker, there is an earlier case reaching a directly
opposite conclusion. In Citizens for Clean Air v. Corps of
Engineers,4 8 the plaintiffs challenged a permit issued by the
Corps under the same statutory authority as the permit in
Rucker. 9 The Corps did not file an impact statement but only
submitted the evaluations of other agencies. The court acknowledged that the Corps would have been justified in determining
that an EIS was not required but found:
[T]his perfunctory listing of other agencies' conclusions is
an inadequate record to support the Corps' threshold determination and legally constitutes arbitrary and capricious action,
however earnestly the course was chosen.
The decision to issue the permit without the environmental
impact review was counter to the fundamental requirements of
NEPA.10
The relative size of the project involved is the only basis upon
which these cases are distinguishable, but the majority in Rucker
must have believed this distinction to be legitimate. Apparently
attempting to prevent waste of judicial resources, they felt that
the proposed project clearly was not major and probably would
have no significant effect on the environment. Since an EIS
would obviously not be needed, the court saw no real reason to
reverse the decision of the district court.
Judge Craven dissented because he believed that strict compliance with the procedural requirements of NEPA was mandatory, regardless of expense. Further, he apparently thought that
a greater savings of judicial resources would result from strict
insistence upon procedural regularity, thereby establishing a precedent to warn other agencies that noncompliance with NEPA's
procedural requirements would not be tolerated.
The decision of the majority indicates that it viewed Rucker
as a burden of proof case in which the plaintiffs could not establish their claim. Judge Craven felt that this analysis was misdiSave Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970); see note 3 supra.
50. Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696, 707 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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rected and insisted that the decision should have focused on the
Corps' procedural shortcomings. His view is subject to criticism
since the Corps altered its regulations' immediately after the
permit was issued, making repetition of the Corps' action in
Rucker impossible. Correction of the Corps' procedural shortcomings would therefore no longer be a valid reason for reversal.
As Judge Craven pointed out,5 however, the change in regulations had, in effect, demonstrated that the procedures the
Corps had utilized in Rucker were insufficient to ensure that the
requirements of NEPA were met. More important, however, is
the effect the decision will have on agencies which still have regulations similar to those the Corps had utilized before Rucker. This
decision will allow such agencies to continue to make threshold
determinations without explaining the rationale supporting their
position. Even though the new regulations will prevent the Corps
from utilizing this questionable procedure in the future, the court
should nevertheless have reversed the case to ensure that other
agencies would adopt the correct procedures. This implication
that other agencies need not explain their threshold determinations, along with the court's discussion of what constitutes a
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," ensures the continued vitality of the
Rucker case.
Courts have the duty of interpreting the statutory phrase
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.

' 53

Statutory interpretation is a function at

which the courts are relatively more expert than are administrative agencies. 4 To allow agencies to avoid the procedural requirements of NEPA by arbitrarily asserting that the project in question is not a major federal action significantly affecting the envi51. Eng'r Reg. No. 1105-2-507, 38 Fed. Reg. 9243 (Apr. 12, 1973).
52. 484 F.2d at 164.
53. Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 356 F. Supp. 14, 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 286 (E.D.N.C.
1973); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
54. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACnoN 613 (1965). See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1961); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.

344, 354 (1943). Hardin v. Kentucky Util., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968), states:
The role of the courts should, in particular, be viewed hospitably where...
the question sought to be reviewed does not significantly engage the agency's
expertise. . . . "[W]here the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning
of the statutory term," . . . [the controversy] presents issues on which courts,
and not administrators, are relatively more expert.
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ronment would render the Act powerless. 5 "The spirit of the Act
would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that the project
was minor or did not significantly affect the environment were too
well shielded from impartial review."5 6
Rucker listed various indicial7 which courts at different times
had utilized in determining whether a proposed project was a
major federal action. This list included projects financed wholly
or in part by the federal government, designed or planned in part
by a federal agency, and carried out under the auspices of a
federal agency. The court pointed out that at other times the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had "focused on the qualitative impact [of the project] upon the environment in order to
determine whether federal action was major."6 The court found
none of these indicia present in Rucker and therefore held that
issuance of the permit for the proposed project was not a major
federal action.'
The initial attempt to define "major Federal action" was
Sierra Club v. Hardin," which dealt with the licensing of a pulp
mill in a region which arguably could have qualified for wilderness status under the Wilderness Act of 1964.63 The court stated
that, while "it may be possible in the future to develop some per
se categories of major federal actions, . . [past experience with
such mills] dictates that for the present complete investigation
of the impact of individual mills will continue to be appropri55. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455
F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972).
56. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463,466 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1177 (6th Cir. 1972), citing City of N.Y.
v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), which states:
To permit the agency to ignore its duties under NEPA with impunity because we have serious doubts that its ultimate decision will be affected by
compliance would subvert the very purpose of the Act and encourage further
administrative laxity in this area. . . .Preservation of the integrity of NEPA
necessitates that the Commission be required to follow the steps set forth in
§ 102, even if it now seems likely that those steps will lead it to adhere to the
present result.
57. 484 F.2d at 163.
58. Id.
59. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Izaak Walton
League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D.D.C. 1971).
60. 484 F.2d at 163.
61. Id.
62. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D.Alas. 1971).
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1972).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

ate."
The courts have since attempted to develop various per se
categories to describe major federal actions. The list of indicia in
Rucker was only one such attempt. Another court has stated that
a federal action is major if it requires substantial planning, time,
resources or expenditures. Another defined an action as major
if the administrator retained any significant discretionary powers
permitting him to make design alterations.6 Still another stated
that major federal action typically existed "only when a project
is wholly or partly federally funded."6 Generally, however, the
courts agree that the existence of a major federal action is to be
determined by "a judgment based on the circumstances of the
proposed action."6
No articulated tests to identify major federal actions can
provide acceptable results in all cases. To illustrate, if an action
is held to be major "only when a project is wholly or partly federally funded," construction of a federally-funded pier would be a
major federal action. If it significantly affected the environment,
it would be subject to the procedural controls of NEPA. On the
other hand, clear cutting of thousands of acres of a national forest
would not be a major federal action and therefore not subject to
NEPA, regardless of the environmental devastation it would
cause. In enacting NEPA, Congress could not have intended such
an incongruous result. While it is true that all legal tests can be
criticized for occasionally reaching unfair results, articulated
tests for major federal actions are especially susceptible to such
criticism.
The process of selecting the criteria which make up an articulated test subjects such a test to further attack. Despite the explicit statement in Rucker that no attempt was made to "limit
the list""0 to the criteria noted, the court could easily have included "federally licensed ' 70 as one of its categories. The Court
64. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 126 n.52 (D. Alas. 1971).
65. This test is perhaps the most popular articulated test. Citizens Organized to
Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Julis
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
66. Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 890 (1st Cir. 1973).

67. James River & Kanawha Canal Parks v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359
F. Supp. 611, 628 (E.D. Va. 1973).

68. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 n.7 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. 484 F.2d at 163.
70. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1972).
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has stated that "the only involvement necessary by the federal government to constitute
major federal action is approving or licensing the project."7 ' In
Rucker, the decision to omit "federally licensed" as an approved
category dictated the outcome of the case. An attempt to articulate an acceptable list of indicia of major federal action draws the
attention of the court away from consideration of what the test
should be for future diverse factual situations.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
considered the meaning of the phrase "major Federal action" in
holding that NEPA required the preparation of an EIS for major
federal research programs which, when instituted, would significantly affect the environment. 2 The court stated that federal
action exists "not only when an agency proposes to build a facility
itself, but also whenever an agency makes a decision which permits action by other parties which will affect the quality of the
environment. 7 3 Further, NEPA's procedural requirements have
"been held to apply where a federal agency . . . grants licenses
and permits to private parties. ' 74 In such a case, the action taken
by the federal agency affected the environment because "the
agency made a decision which permitted some other party- private or governmental-to take action affecting the environ75
ment."
This analysis suggests that a proper test for major federal
actions should not consist of the articulation of various indicia of
major federal actions; instead it should focus on the nature and
extent of federal participation and the effect of the particular
project on the environment. 76 The benefits of such a flexible approach would successfully answer the objections raised to articulated tests by assuming that the legislative purpose is served.
Application of this analysis to a particular factual situation will
71. Id. at 597 (emphasis added), citing Izaac Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F.
Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Scientist's Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC,
481 F.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Bd.v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412,
419 (2d Cir. 1972).
72. Scientist's Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1089.
76. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), as discussed in text accompanying
notes 58-59 supra. See also Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971), and
text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
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not result in the arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of criteria which
will control unforeseeable situations, perhaps automatically precluding the proper result. Each case is analyzed solely on the
basis of the nature and extent of federal involvement in that
particular case, an approach which appears inherently viable."
The operation of this proposed test is simple-as the significance of the effect of a proposed project on the environment increases, the requisite amount of federal involvement decreases. 78
The test therefore does not allow the establishment of specific
indicia of major federal action because considerations will vary
depending upon the facts of the particular case. For example, to
subject the licensing of the Alaska pipeline to the procedural
controls of NEPA, one looks to the nature of the federal involvement (licensing) and the tremendous effect of the project on the
environment. Because the impact is great, the federal involvement required to invoke the procedural requirements of NEPA
77. Since the phrase "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" is so difficult to define, it is obviously just as difficult to determine
whether agency application of the phrase is arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, de novo
review of factors considered by the agency is entirely appropriate. Review should be
directed at determining "whether the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith
consideration of environmental factors made under the standards set in §§ 101 and 102
of NEPA . . . ." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (8th
Cir. 1973). The above cases relied on the contention that:
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements of the Act,
we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions
on the merits. . . .NEPA is silent as to judicial review, and no special reasons
appear for not reviewing the decision of the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of substantive review should improve the quality of agency decisions and
should make it more likely that the broad purposes of NEPA will be realized.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298-99 (8th Cir. 1972).
See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm-,-Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
Additionally,
it is the courts' function to insure that the mandate of the statute. . . has been
carried out and that all relevant environmental effects of the project be given
appropriate consideration by the responsible official whenever it is unreasonable
to conclude that the project is without the purview of the Act.
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
omitted), quotingfrom Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467'(5th Cir. 1973).
78. Of course, federal involvement can never decrease to the point that federal action
is no longer arguably "major." Inclusion of the term "major" in NEPA "raises the obvious
inference" that not all federal actions are meant to be included. Julis v. City of Cedar
Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D. Iowa 1972). See also James River & Kanawha Canal
Parks v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611, 628 (E.D. Va. 1973); Citizens Organized to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540 (S.D.
Ohio 1972).
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may be minimal. Hence the licensing procedure in this situation
would be characterized as a major federal action, and the project
would be subject to the procedural controls of NEPA. On the
other hand, if one considers Willis' pier in Rucker, he finds the
same federal involvement (licensing), but the project has only
minimal effect on the environment. Since the impact is small and
the federal involvement less than considerable, the licensing procedure would be characterized as non-major, and the project
could proceed without being subjected to the controls of NEPA.
This suggested "sliding scale" test will enable courts to analyze
more fully those activities which Congress apparently desired
agencies to consider in reaching decisions which may affect the
environment. It will prevent inadvertent environmental degradation by agencies of the federal government, a primary purpose of
the Act, and better enable the courts to evaluate the need for EIS
procedures in any particular factual situation.
This procedure has frequently been utilized when need for
environmental protection was readily apparent. For example, in
79 the possibility of adGreene County Planning Board v. FPC,
verse environmental consequences outweighed the relatively
slight federal involvement. The Commission, concerned only with
licensing the private construction of a pump storage power project, was required to file an EIS before construction was permitted. Similarily, in Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommission, Inc.
v. AEC,"0 the Commission was required to prepare an EIS even
though its only contact with the proposed project was its licensing
of the nuclear reactor. In Wyoming Outdoor CoordinatingCouncil v. Butz,'81 the Forest Service proposed to issue a permit to allow
private clear cutting of a portion of Teton National Forest. While
issuance of the permit was the sole federal involvement, the action was deemed major, and an EIS was required. There is extensive case law describing what does8 2 and does not 3 constitute
79. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
80. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
81. 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
82. Id.; Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287
(1st Cir. 1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d
1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); National Helium Corp.
v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78 (D. Kan. 1973); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
356 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); McLean Gardens v. National Capital Planning Comm'n,
4 ENVIR. REP. 1708 (D.D.C., Oct. 21, 1972); Billings v. Camp, 4 ENviR. REP. 1744 (D.D.C.,
Oct. 4, 1972); Arizona Wildlife Fed'n v. Volpe, 4 EvIR. REP. 1637 (D. Ariz., Sept. 15,
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major federal action, but each decision must be re-evaluated in
light of the suggested test.
Rucker only cursorily considered the meaning of the phrase
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,; 8 4
briefly discussing the effect of granting the permit in burden-ofproof language.5 The court found that the permit application
would not have the effect of introducing a previously nonexistent
use." This finding indicates that preparation of a highly expensive EIS for a pier to which no governmental agency had objected
was a waste of resources. It was therefore unnecessary for the
court to analyze more fully the actual meaning of the word "significantly."
Defining "significantly," however, has caused courts as
much difficulty as analyzing the word "major." "Although all
words may be 'chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment,' 'significantly' has that quality more than most."8' 7
Judge Skelly Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia believes that the permissible interpretations are intentionally broad. He maintains that they properly reflect "the Act's
1972); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F.
Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972);
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp.
389 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D.
Vt. 1972); Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972);
Businessmen Affected Severely by Yearly Action Plans, Inc. v. District of Columbia City
Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972); City of N.Y. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150
(E.D.NY. 1972); Sierra Club v. Sargent, 3 ENVIR. REP. 1905 (W.D. Wash., Mar. 16, 1972);
Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971); Willamette Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 990 (D. Ore. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 331 F. Supp. 926 (D.D.C. 1971).
83. Kings County Economic Community Dev. Ass'n v. Hardin, 478 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.
1973); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973); Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); Jones v. District of Columbia Redev.
Land Agency, 5 ENVIR. Rsp. 1139 (D.D.C., Mar. 7, 1973); Durnfurd v. Ruckelshaus, 5
ENVIR. REP. 1007 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 12, 1972); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.
Va, 1972); Maddox v. Bradley, 345 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Indian Lookout
Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Morris v. TVA, 345 F. Supp. 321
(N.D. Ala. 1972); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Citizens
for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D: Me. 1972); Echo Park Residents Comm.
v. Romney, 3 Ewam. REP. 1255 (C.D. Cal., May 11, 1971).
84. 484 F.2d at 163.
85. Id. at 163 n.7.
86. Id. at 163. This test is a traditional one indicating a significant effect on the
environment.
87. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
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attempt to promote an across-the-board adjustment in federal
agency decision-making" 8 requiring that the quality of the environment be of concern to all federal agencies."9 Two courts have
specifically noted a "complete lack of Congressional or administrative guidelines"90 to be used in interpreting the term "significantly." Proper definition of the term is therefore left entirely to
the courts." This approach seems perfectly justified because:
[T]he bulk of the important questions in environmental cases
call more for the talents and training of the courts and judges
than for those of the administrative agencies and administrators. The basic reason is the very breadth of the questions, the
requirement of balancing opposing economic and social interests. Such balancing and weighing require more art than
science. There is no technical formula under which "the presershrines" can be weighed
vation of natural beauty and historic
9' 2
against "the cost of a project.

Concern must therefore be directed toward determining how
courts, rather than agencies,9" have defined "significantly." Congressional intent in passing NEPA assists in determining the limits of the word. Section 102 of the Act makes "exploration and
consideration of environmental factors an integral part of the
administrative decision-making process." 94 Moreover, it requires
that the agencies "strive constantly to improve federal programs
to preserve and enhance the environment." 95 President Nixon has
88. Scientist's Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
89. Id. See also Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1973); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 (6th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.
Supp. 886, 889 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
90. First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1973); Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972).
91. The function of the reviewing court is to determine de novo all relevant questions
of law. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1972). See also K. DAVIS,
4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
92. Sive, Some Thoughts of an EnvironmentalLawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 612, 629 (1970) (footnotes omitted). See also Hardin v.
Kentucky Util., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) & note 54 supra.
93. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit disagreed
with the government's contention that the procedural mandates of section 102(2)(C) applied only to actions found by the agency itself to have a significant environmental effect.
94. City of N.Y. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
95. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 (6th Cir. 1972);
accord, Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972);
Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Environmental Defense Fund,
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said that NEPA requires the agencies to develop "measures to
protect and enhance environmental quality."9 Senator Henry
Jackson, chairman of the Senate Interior Committee and chief
proponent of the Act, stated:
If an environmental policy is to become more than rhetoric
. . . each of these agencies must be enabled and directed to

participate in active and objective oriented environmental management. Concern for environmental quality must be made part
of every phase of Federal action."
Thus, the definition of "significantly" that one finally adopts
must emphasize preservation of the environment as the paramount concern. It appears that if a major federal action could (as
opposed to would) significantly affect the quality of the environment, NEPA demands preparation of an EIS.
In defining "significantly," the courts have attempted to establish a rule of law to meet all contingencies. These tests, however, are not subject to criticism like the tests for determining
major federal action but rather are inherently flexible and require
a case-by-case analysis. The Second and Seventh Circuits utilize
a two-part test that considers: first, the extent to which the action
by itself will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of
those created by existing uses and second, the quantitative adverse effects of the act or project itself, including the cumulative
harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions. 8 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 293-94 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the court said, "[In
enacting NEPA Congress resolved that it will not allow federal agencies nor federal funds
to be used in a predatory manner as far as the environment is concerned."
96. Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 526 (1972). President Nixon has since stated
that:
Environmental concern must crystalize into permanent patterns of thought
and action. What began as an environmental awakening must mature finally
into a new and higher environmental way of life. If we flag in our dedication and
will, the problems themselves will not go away.
Special Message to the Congress on Environmental Protection, 1972 U.S. CODE, CONG. &
An. News 605 (Feb. 8, 1972).
97. 115 CONG. REc. 29087 (1st Sess. 1969). See also, Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (D. Del. 1972); Conservation Council v.
Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 225 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
98. First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1973); Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972). The second portion of the "two-part test"
would appear to subsume the first. The courts are apparently concerned with both the
absolute effect of the project itself and the cumulative effect of the project when considered in conjunction with other pre-existing uses. "One more 'factory polluting air and water
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announced three criteria99 to be utilized in reviewing any agency
claim that an act or project is not significant-whether an agency
took a "hard look" at the problem, whether the agency identified
the relevant areas of environmental concern, and whether the
agency made a convincing argument that the impact will be insignificant.
In addition to and independent of these judicially derived
tests is the requirement, established by the Guidelines of the
Council on Environmental Quality, that an EIS be prepared
when the environmental impact of proposed major federal actions
is likely to be "highly controversial." '0 While this phrase has not
been the subject of extensive interpretation, there are opposing
views of its actual meaning. In apparently the first judicial consideration of the phrase, the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon applied a literal interpretation by quoting the
Guidelines. It then stated that from the inception of the proposed
activity opponents of the project had been petitioning governmental agencies "in the hope of convincing them that the building's construction would be a hazard to the environment." ' According to the court, this vocal opposition sufficiently identified
the project as "highly controversial." ' 2
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted the view
that:
[Tihe term "controversial" apparently refers to cases where a
substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature, or effect of the
major federal action rather than the existence of opposition to
use, the effect of which is relatively undisputed. . . . The
suggestion that "controversial" must be equated with neighborhood opposition has [been rejected].'
In his dissent, Judge Friendly maintained that:
[The CEQ Guidelines] provide that "if there is a potential that
in an area zoned for industrial use may represent the straw that breaks the back of the
environmental camel." Id. at 831.
99. Maryland - National Capital Park & Planning Comm. v. United States Postal
Serv., No. 72-2126 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 23, 1973).
100. See para. 5(b) note 32 supra.
101. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D. Ore. 1971).
102. Id. See also Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D. Me.
1972), in which the court noted the requirement of an EIS in "controversial" situations
but failed to apply this standard in deciding the case.
103. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). See
also Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D. Me. 1971).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

the environment may be significantly affected," the statement
is to be prepared.
I see no basis for reading this as limited to cases where there
is a dispute over what the environmental effects actually will be.
Rather I would think it clear that this includes action which the
agency should know is likely to arouse intense opposition, even
if the actual environmental impact is readily apparent. ' "
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has taken the view
that the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines are merely
advisory because the Council lacks the authority to prescribe
regulations governing compliance with NEPA.0 5 In accord with
this view, unless the "highly controversial" language of the
Guidelines is incorporated into the regulations of the agency, this
06
requirement of the Council will not be enforceable in court."
The Fifth Circuit view seems to be preferable to that of the
Second Circuit. The only "action-forcing" provision of NEPA
speaks in terms of "actions significantly affecting the . . . environment."''0 It is difficult to see how the phrase "highly controversial" fits into the Second Circuit's own test of "significantly
affecting the environment." 0 8 If the phrase "highly controversial"
cannot be so categorized, the only way that it can force an agency
to act is if the agency itself has adopted "action-forcing" regulations containg such language.
If an agency has included "highly controversial" in its regulations, the majority view of the Second Circuit seems preferable
to that of Judge Friendly, who would allow the decision whether
to require an EIS to depend upon the visibility of environmentalists' objections. The majority pointed out that to have held as
Judge Friendly suggested would have surrendered "the determination [of whether an EIS was required] to opponents of a major
federal action, no matter how insignificant its environmental effect when viewed objectively." ' 9
Whether the reviewing court utilizes the test of the Second
and Seventh Circuits or that of the District of Columbia Circuit,
104. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
105. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).

106. Id. at 426.
107. NEPA, § 102(2)(C); see note 16 supra.
108. See text accompanying note 98 supra.

109. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 n.9A (2d Cir. 1972).
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the test must be applied in a manner which will permit flexibility
in the analysis of future cases. The word "significantly" can, after
all, be interpreted to mean anything from "'not trivial' through
'appreciable' to 'important' and even 'momentous.' """
NEPA's objectives are to declare "a national policy which
will encourage . . . harmony between man and environment
[and] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment.""' It is therefore inconceivable that Congress
intended to allow agencies to escape the provisions of section 102
of the Act by interpreting "significant" to mean nothing other
than "important" through "momentous." One of the purposes of
the EIS "is to insure that the relevant environmental data are
before the agency and considered by it prior to the decision to
commit federal resources to the project.""' If an agency could
escape the procedural requirements of NEPA by categorizing an
action as "not momentous" and therefore "not significant," it
would fail to supply that environmental data which Congress, in
enacting NEPA, had contemplated would be made available.
This procedure would force Congress, in deciding whether to commit federal resources, to balance projected benefits of a proposed
project against unknown amounts of environmental degradation.
Excluding from consideration those projects that have an "appreciable" effect would contravene the intent of the Act. This inexcusable result can be avoided only if "significant" is interpreted
to mean "'not trivial' through 'appreciable.' 11,,3
110. Id. at 837.
111. NEPA, § 101(a) provides as follows:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial
and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
112. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
113. Id. Of course, actions with only trivial effect would not require preparation of
an EIS. Use of the term "significant" excludes some actions with minor effect; cf. note 78
supra.
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The test established by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia"' provides an excellent method of identifying those
actions which do significantly affect the quality of the environment. The court must first question whether the agency took a
"hard look" at the problem." 5 Did the federal officials carry out
"the mandate of Congress to accord a high priority to environmental factors"?"' Did the balancing by the agency give insufficient weight to the environmental values expressed in the Act?" 7'
faith weighing
Was the agency's decision consistent with a good
8
of the environmental impact of the project?"
After answering these questions, the court should consider
whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental
concern in making its determination. For projects in urban areas,
the court might require that the agency consider such things as
population distribution, sewer facilities, traffic, community support facilities, air and water pollution, drainage, aesthetics and
noise."' For rural projects, the court could require consideration
of wilderness values, fish and wildlife distribution and density,
migratory patterns, plant life, timber regeneration time, air and
114. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
115. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 410 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd,
484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973)1 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78, 94 (D.
Kan. 1973). The question of who has the burden of proving whether or not the agency has
considered these factors is currently unsettled. The courts which place the burden on the
plaintiff do so partially because of the enormous dollar cost of an EIS but primarily
because the procedure is time-consuming both in man-hours needed to prepare a report
and in time lost at the beginning of projects. Howard v. EPA, 4 ENvur. REP. 1731 (W.D.
Va., Sept. 14, 1972). The opposing view places the burden on the agency after the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing of non-compliance with NEPA. First Nat'l Bank v. Watson,
363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Tex.
1973). It is the agency, not the plaintiff, that is charged with the protection of the environment. Since virtually all of the record is produced by the agency, the better view would
seemingly place the burden on the agency. The very nature of the problem "is so extensive
that if the burden were placed wholly on citizen plaintiffs, the full disclosure requirements
of NEPA would never be implemented satisfactorily. . . ." 359 F. Supp. at 1335.
116. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1175 (6th Cir. 1972).
117. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 5 ENVIR. REP. 1183 (E.D. Tenn.,
Mar. 21, 1973).
118. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D.
Vt. 1973).
119. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); Save
Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973); McLean Gardens v. National
Capital Planning Comm., 4 ENvIR. REp. 1708 (D.D.C., Oct. 21, 1972); Town of Groton v.
Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D. Conn. 1972); Maryland - National Capital Park &
Planning Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 349 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 (D.D.C 1972);
Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D. Ore. 1971).
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water pollution, soil degradation and aesthetics. 12 For suburban
areas, the court could utilize a combination of factors; the flexibility of the test allows consideration of the environmental characteristics which are important in the particular case.
Finally, the court should consider whether the agency made
a convincing argument that the impact was not significant.' The
court could here apply a standard varying from "could be not
trivial" to "could be appreciable," again depending upon the
nature of the threatened environmental degradation balanced
against the values of the proposed project. Such an approach
would retain the necessary flexibility.
Observation of the functioning of NEPA leads one to question the actual effectiveness of the Act and its highly expensive
EIS. The authors of two early law review articles questioned the
real effectiveness of the Act, 12 2 and time may have justified their
fears. Consider the following statement made by Senator Jackson
in 1969:
The inadequacy of present knowledge, policies, and institutions is reflected in our Nation's history, in our national attitudes, and in our contemporary life. It touches every aspect of
man's existence. It threatens, it degrades, and destroys the quality of life which all men seek.
We see increasing evidence of this inadequacy all around
120. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
121. The following cases give examples of significantactions: Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78 (D. Kan. 1973); McLean Gardens v. National Capital Planning
Comm'n, 4 ENRvm. REP. 1708 (D.D.C., Oct. 21, 1972); Billings v. Camp, 4 ENvnR. REP. 1744
(D.D.C., Oct. 4, 1972); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Sierra Club
v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Businessmen Affected Severely by Yearly Action Plans, Inc. v. District of Columbia City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972); City
of N.Y. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Goose Hollow Foothills
League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971). The following cases give examples of
non-significant actions: Kings County Economic Community Dev. Ass'n v. Hardin, 478
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.
1973); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank
v. Watson, 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973); Durnfurd v. Ruckelshaus, 5 ENVIR. RE. 1007
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 12, 1972); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972);
Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W. Va. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
122. Note, NEPA, Full of Sound and Fury. . . ?, 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 116 (1971);
Note, The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 37 BROOKLY,N
L. REv. 139 (1970).
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us: hap-hazard urban and suburban growth; crowding, congestion, and conditions within our central cities which result in
civil unrest and detract from man's social and psycbological
well-being; the loss of valuable open spaces; inconsistent and,
often, incoherent rural and urban land-use policies; critical air
and water pollution problems; diminishing recreational opportunity; continuing soil erosion; the degradation of unique ecosystems; needless deforestation; the decline and extinction of
fish and wildlife species; faltering and poorly designed transportation systems; poor architectural design and ugliness in
public and private structures; rising levels of noise; the continued proliferation of pesticides and chemicals without adequate
consideration of the consequences; radiation hazards; thermal
pollution; an increasingly ugly landscape cluttered with billboards, powerlines, and junkyards; growing scarcity of essential
resources; and many, many other environmental quality problems. "'
In the four and one half years since this statement was made,
there seems to have been little environmental improvement.'2 4 By
placing the responsibility for environmental protection on existing agencies, Congress has probably asked for the impossible. As
was recently noted in Developments in Environmental Law:
[Flor the most part the agencies which must do the "full good
faith" balancing of economic and social costs against environmental costs are generally structured to be advocates for economic expansion. As long as agencies are left to do the balancing, and so long as they have a dual mandate of environmental
protection and economic development in their particular
field-for example, power growth for the FPC, nuclear development for the AEC, or flood containment for the Army Corps of
Engineers-is not the environment bound to come out on the
short end?' '
123. 115 CONG. REc. S12125 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1969).
124. It must be remembered that NEPA was passed in recognition of the increasing
pressures on the environment:
The inadequacy of present knowledge, policies, and institutions is reflected
in our nation's history, in our national attitudes, and in our contemporary
We no longer have the margins for error that we enjoyed. The ultimate
life ....
issue posed by shortsighted, conflicting and selfish demands and pressures upon
the finite resources of the earth are [sic] clear.
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969).
125. Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENVIR. L. REP. 50001, 50008 (1973)
(emphasis in original).
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It is always the responsibility of the reviewing court to insure
that the goals of NEPA are not avoided by threshold agency
determinations that an EIS is not needed. The courts must demand a statement by a responsible agency official delineating
why no EIS has been prepared. If no such statement is forthcoming, the court should preliminarily enjoin the proposed project.
Only in this manner can the court accurately determine whether
a proposed agency action is a major federal action significantly
affecting the environment and thereby subject to the procedural
controls of NEPA.
RICHARD
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INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL DEATH-A PROVISION LIMITING RECOVERY OF ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS TO AN OCCURRENCE OF

DEATH WITHIN NINETY DAYS OF THE ACCIDENT IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND UNENFORCEABLE. Burne v- FranklinLife Insurance

Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
Appellant brought an action for the recovery of double indemnity, accidental death benefits under a life insurance policy'
issued to her husband by appellee insurance company. While the
policy was in effect, the insured sustained serious injuries which
rendered him an invalid from the moment of his accident. The
utilization of sophisticated and expensive medical techniques,
however, kept the insured alive in a comatose state for 41/2 years.
The insurance company paid the face amount of the policy but
refused to pay the accidental death benefits. The court of common pleas granted the insurance company's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the insured's death had not occurred
within ninety days of the accident and therefore did not meet the
time limitation expressed in the double indemnity provision. 2 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower
court, with directions that summary judgment be entered for
appellant.3 A policy provision limiting payment of accidental
1. The policy, naming appellant as beneficiary, was in the amount of $15,000 and also
contained a double indemnity provision for an additional $15,000 if the death of the
insured resulted from purely accidental means. Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa.
218, 220, 301 A.2d 799, 800 (1973).
2. Id. at 221, 301 A.2d at 801. The policy stated that accidental death benefits would
be payable only if "death occurred ... within ninety days from the date of the accident."
Id.
The grant of summary jddgment was based also on the following exception in the
policy: "This Accidental Death Benefit shall not be payable * * * (10) if the death of the
insured shall occur while any premium is being waived under any disability benefit attached to or incorporated in said policy." Id.
3. Id. at 227, 301 A.2d at 804. The supreme court reversed the lower court's enforcement of both the time-limitation provision and the waiver-of-premium exception. See note
2 supra. The supreme court said the waiver-of-premium exception was invalid because it
contravened public policy and created an "obvious ambiguity" when read in conjunction
with the entire waiver-of-premium supplement. Id. at 226, 301 A.2d at 803-04. The Burne
dissent criticized this portion of the majority's holding and claimed that whatever ambiguity existed in the waiver-of-premium exception was manufactured by the court. Id. at
240-41, 301 A.2d at 810-11. Although the dissent might have a valid claim, the majority's
finding of ambiguity in an actually unambiguous policy term is a traditional technique
of judicial construction employed to avoid the harsh results to the insured of the operation
of the clause. See, Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the BargainHypothesis, 5
AKRON L. REV. 1, 6 (1972). See also pp. 159-60 infra. Since Burne's approach to the
question of the validity of the waiver-of-premium clause is not a novel one, this paper will
not treat it.
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death benefits to an occurrence of death within ninety days of the
accident is unenforceable on grounds of public policy and is not
applicable when there is no dispute about cause of death.4
Until Burne v. Franklin Life Insurance Co.,5 judicial construction of time-limitation clauses in accidental death insurance
policies had been characterized by strict application of general
contract law. One of the earliest accident-insurance cases to be
decided in the United States, Perry v. Provident Life Insurance
& Investment Co.,7 involved a claim for accidental death benefits
under a policy limiting recovery to an occurrence of death within
ninety days of the accident. Since the insured's death had occurred just beyond the ninety-day period, 8 no computation of
time could bring the death within the coverage of the policy. The
court noted "the loss in this case came very near being within the
terms of the policy, ' but it did not attempt to avoid the harsh
results of an application of general contract principles. In reject4. The dissent also argued that the majority's decision regarding the time-limitation
clause suffered from an ambiguity:
Is the reader to understand (1) that all 90-day provisions in accidental death
benefit endorsements are invalid as violative of public policy, or (2) only those
found in policies owned by insureds who in fact die outside 90 days but without
"some possible uncertainty" as to causation?
451 Pa. at 234, 301 A.2d at 807.
Although the majority's holding might have been clearer, the majority did not say it was
striking the time-limitation clause in all situations but only in the case in which there is
no dispute that the cause of death was accidental. The import of the decision, however,
is effectively to eliminate an insurance company's use of the time-limitation clause to
limit its liability.
5. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
6. The prevailing view regarding insurance policy terms in general is that they should
be construed as any other contractual term to give full effect to the intention of the parties
if that intention is not contrary to public policy. See Kingman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 243 S.C. 405, 411, 134 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1964); 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND
§ 7381, at 1 (1943); W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 136, at

PRrcE

808 (3d ed. 1951). It is also generally accepted that insurers have the right to limit their
liabilities and to impose whatever conditions they please on their obligations, provided
they are not in contravention of some statutory provision or public policy. See Rhame v.
National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 539, 544, 121 S.E.2d 94, 96-97 (1961). A few
decisions, on the other hand, have indicated a different rule of construction should apply
to insurance policies from that which applies to ordinary contracts. E.g., Wilson v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 90 Vt. 105, 109-10, 96 A. 540, 542 (1916). The special nature
of insurance contracts, however, has not compelled the courts to apply a different rule of
construction to time-limitation clauses. See p. 151 infra.
7. 99 Mass. 162 (1868).
8. The insured had been injured on December 11, 1866, at 9:00 A.M. and had died
ninety-one days later on March 12, 1867, at 9:00 A.M. The court counted the date of the
accident in its computation. Id. at 163.
9. Id. at 16a
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ing the beneficiary's claim that enforcing the time-limitation provision would violate the "general object and tenor of the policy,"'"
the court implied that the operation of the contract had fulfilled
the parties' expectations.
Since the Perry decision in 1868, all reported American decisions involving a similar question have upheld the validity of the
time-limitation clause." It has been upheld against claims that
it was unfair to the insured, 2 unreasonable, 13 contradictory to the
main policy provision," and contrary to public policy.' 5 Most decisions have denied recovery to the beneficiary because the beneficiary failed to state a cause of action, without an examination
of the validity of the provision.' 6
10. Id. at 163. The same court in a later decision avoided the harsh result of a strict
application of contract principles in the construction of another provision within the same
policy. The provision provided for weekly disability payments for accidental injuries that
were not fatal. Construing that provision together with the accidental death provision, the
court concluded: "[Tihe evident intent is that, if any injury happens within the meaning
of the policy, it is insured against or coming within one class or the other." Perry v.
Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 103 Mass. 242, 243 (1869). On this basis the court awarded
the beneficiary the disability payments before the insured's death.
The second Perry decision is an example of the accident-insurance cases in which the
courts have wavered from the rule that ordinary contract principles govern the operation
of insurance policies. See Hudson, Insuringand Exclusion Clauses in Individual,Accident
and Health Policies, 1958 INs. L.J. 135. In the early years of accident-insurance policies,
courts tended to consider "as accidental or an accident anything that could be fitted
within the dictionary definitions of these two words." Id. at 145. In the view of some
commentators, the courts' tendency to avoid the harsh results of a strict application of
contract law brought about a warping of general contract principles when applied to
accident-insurance policies. See, e.g., Note, Problems Created by the Purchaser'sInability to Bargain Over Life Insurance, 29 IND. L.J. 635, 639 (1953-54). Accident-insurance
cases involving time-limitation clauses, however, have not been characterized by a departure from a strict application of contract principles. The time-limitation provision apparently has been an effective shield for the insurance companies in their rivalry with the
courts that have sought to extend their liability in accident-insurance cases. See VANCE,
supra note 6, § 180, at 944.
11. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 131 (1971), which collects cases involving a question of
the validity of provisions in accident policies limiting payment of benefits for death and
other losses to those losses that occur within a specified time from the date of the accident.
There are no reported South Carolina decisions involving the validity of the timelimitation clause.
12. Brown v. United States Cas. Co., 95 F. 975 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
13. Clarke v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 180 I1. App. 300 (1913).
14. Alamo Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cardwell, 67 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934).
15. Bennett v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Mullins v.
National Cas. Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins.
Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
16. E.g., Orill v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Cal.
1942); Randall v. State Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 268, 145 S.E.2d 41 (1965); Thompson
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In all the decisions, the claims of the beneficiaries have been
defeated by the familiar principle of freedom of contract.'7 The
courts have relied upon the premise that an insurance policy is a
voluntary contract into which the parties freely entered, and
therefore the unambiguous contract terms should bind them
both,' Perhaps the harshest result of the application of the voluntary contract concept was reached in Mullins v. National Casualty Co. 9 In that case, the insured died just five hours beyond
the expiration of the thirty-day period, and for the last twentyfour hours before his death he had been practically pulseless. The
doctor testified that, from the moment of the accident, the insured never had a chance to recover and the herculean medical
efforts made had merely prolonged his life. Despite the oppressive
operation of the thirty-day provision, the court denied the beneficiary recovery of the accidental death benefits. 2° Thus, equitable
considerations, even when they seem to be overwhelming, have
been insufficient to overcome time-limitation contractual provisions.
Although the beneficiaries in some cases have raised claims
that the time-limitation clauses were unreasonable or unfair, 2'
the courts did not address the issue of whether the insurance
policies under examination might be considered "contracts of
adhesion.

22 The

special nature of insurance policies which might

v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 179 Iowa 603, 161 N.W. 655 (1917). Orill raised the
issue of pre-existing disease, and Thompson involved a question of whether the accident
caused the death-resulting disease. In both cases, however, the time-limitation clause was
the primary basis for the denial of the beneficiaries' claims.
17. E.g., Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964). This decision, one of the latest to uphold the validity of the time-limitation clause,
invoked the principle.
18. Brown v. United States Cas. Co., 95 F. 935, 936 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
19. 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938).
20. The court said:
[Wjith all the liberality to be indulged in favor of the person insured, it must
not be forgotten that the parties to an insurance contract have the right and the
power to contract what accidents and risks shall be covered by it and what shall
not be, and that the courts may not make a new or different contract for the
parties at the instance of one of them.
Id. at 690, 117 S.W.2d at 931.
21. Cases cited notes 12-13 supra.
22, The term "contract of adhesion" was first used in reference to American insurance contracts. See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HRv. L. REy.
198 (1919). "[Fjreedom of contract rarely exists . . . . Life-insurance contracts are contracts of 'adhesion.' The contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely
'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms." Id. at 222.
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identify them as contracts of adhesion has always been apparent.2 3 Because of the unequal bargaining position between the
insurer and the insured, the policy terms are generally not subject
to negotiation. If the insured in Mullins," for example, wished
protection, he had to "adhere" to the terms stipulated by the
insurance company. 25 Even if the bargaining position of the parties had been equal, the insured probably did not have the ability
to understand the complex policy provisions and thus had no
knowledge of the extent of his protection.2 6
Nevertheless, the tendency of the courts has been to ignore
the adhesion argument and to hold the insured bound to the
terms of the policy, even when he has not read the policy.2 The
adhesion argument has not prevailed because the courts have
seen a purpose behind the clause, leading them to conclude it was
a "reasonable provision. '2 In Brown v. United States Casualty
Co., 29 the court assumed that the insurance company had
adopted the terms best suited to the parties. In an attempt to
justify its faith in the good judgment of the insurer, the court said
the assumption was supported by considerations of necessity and
fairness." The provision was necessary because the insurer had no
other way to establish the premium than to limit its liability to
a stated time period; it was fair because statistics and experience
proved that the final result of an accident would show itself
within ninety days of the injury. 3' The court concluded that, al23. The time-limitation clause examined by the court in Brown v. United States Cas.
Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899), was part of a standardized policy. Thus, even the
earliest insurance policies had this element of adhesion.
24. 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938).
25. See Note, supra note 10.
26. Id.
27. See 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:25, at 687-88 (2d ed. 1959).
In the words of Justice Holmes: "No rational theory of contract can be made that does
not hold the assured to know the contents of the instrument to which he seeks to hold the
other party." Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U.S. 605, 609 (1915).
28. Commentators have pointed out another reason. The use of an adhesion analysis
to defeat insurance contractual provisions, the operation of which might produce harsh
results, ignores extensive public control over insurance companies. In most states, there
have for many years been statutory provisions specifying certain insurance policy clauses
and prohibiting others. Furthermore, state insurance commissioners long have had control
over what language may be used in a policy. See KRUEGER & WAGGONER, THE LIFE INsuRANCE POLICY CoNTRAcr 79 (1953); Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, 1954
IND. L.J. 151.
29. 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
30. Id. at 937.
31. The court, however, offered no evidence supporting these two conclusions.
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though the time-limitation provision might operate harshly in
individual cases, "it must be regarded in the same manner as the
fundamental principles of government, seeking the greatest good
'32
to the greatest number.
Other courts examining the purpose behind the clause have
viewed insurance companies more objectively but still have
reached the same result as in Brown.3 In McKinney v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 3 the court said that a stated
period limiting recovery of accidental death benefits was necessary to delineate between deaths caused by accident independently of all other causes and deaths caused by disease. The
arbitrariness of the time period was justified by the difficulty of
the insurer's showing that a death, claimed to be accidental but
actually caused by disease, did not result from the accident.3 5 In
Clarke v. Illinois Men's Association,3 the court employed similar
reasoning to conclude that a time limitation was consistent with
the right and duty of the insurance association to protect itself
and its members against unjust claims.3 7 The Mullins3 court
cited McKinney's reasoning concerning the purpose behind the
clause and rejected the beneficiary's claim that the time of death
was not the essence of the policy.
Recent advances in medical technology have enabled physicians to determine the cause of death with certainty. Apart from
the Burne decision, however, the most recent cases still have
noted the purpose behind the time-limitation clause of delineating purely accidental deaths. 9 In cases in which there was no
dispute that the sole cause of death was the accident, one would
expect the courts to rely solely on the freedom-of-contract princi32. Brown v. United States Cas. Co., 95 F. 935, 937 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
33. Cases cited notes 34, 36 & 38 infra.
34. 211 F. 951 (8th Cir. 1914). The insurance provision under examination in
McKinney stipulated that, if the accident was not followed by immediate and total disability until the moment of the insured's death, the insurer's liability would be limited to
accidental death occurring within ninety days of the accident.
35. The court said: "It is not difficult to prove by the mistaken opinions of witnesses
that a death which occurs more than 90 days after an accident ... was caused by that
accident independent of all other causes, even when the truth is that it was caused by
disease alone .

. . ."

Id. at 952.

36. 180 Ill.
App. 300 (1913).
37. Id. at 303.
38. 273 Ky. 686, 688, 177 S.W.2d 928, 929-30 (1938). See also Contois v. State Mut.
Life Assurance Co., 156 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1946), aff'g 66 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. 11. 1945).
39. E.g., Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
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ple to uphold the validity of the provision. Even in those cases, 40
however, the courts have affirmed the validity of the clause by
citing its purpose as established in the early twentieth century
4
decisions. '
In some decisions, 42 beneficiaries have claimed that, apart
from its arbitrariness, a time-limitation clause violates public
policy in another respect. The beneficiaries apparently attempted
to bring the provision within the class of contractual terms which
tend to "endanger the public interests or injuriously affect the
public good and which are subversive of sound morality .... ,,13
If the provision wre brought within that class, it might be held
unenforceable. The issue of a public policy violation appears to
have been raised first in Mullins.U The beneficiary argued that
the time-limitation clause allowed the insurance company to
profit from the extraordinary efforts made to save the insured's
life. The court acknowledged that the contention presented an
"appealing situation" but disposed of it by affirming the provision's reasonable purpose without discussing the implications of
the beneficiary's argument. 5 In several other cases, 46 the beneficiaries asserted that the requirement of death within a certain time
period violated public policy because it tended to encourage the
beneficiary to deny the insured medical treatment. As in Mullins,
the courts in those cases rejected the argument as unsound with4
out setting forth any basis for that conclusion. 1
Burne offers a striking contrast to the long line of decisions
in other jurisdictions upholding the validity of the timelimitation clause. While those decisions avoided treatment of
40. Bennett v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Mullins v.
National Cas. Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins.
Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
41. See p. 152 & note 35 supra.
42. Weickselbaum v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of America, 129
N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 987, 136 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1954); Douglas
v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
43. E.g., Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 154 (1898) (Harlan, J.).
44. 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938).
45. Id. at 688, 117 S.W.2d at 929-30.
46. Bennett v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Douglas v.
Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
47. In Bennett v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1939), the
court stated, "[T]he policy by reason of this clause is not a wagering policy." The
decision does not explain why that conclusion was reached. See p. 157 supra,for a discussion of why a wagering analysis might be an inappropriate approach to the question of
the validity of the time-limitation clause.
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public policy considerations altogether, Burne presents several
public policy arguments for invalidating the provisions.48 The
Burne court, however, made no distinction among the different
considerations; rather, the "public policy reasons" merged indistinguishably in the opinion. Such an approach would not be subject to criticism if the issues raised by each distinct public policy
argument applied to all. Because each policy argument raises
different issues, one must examine the arguments individually to
determine the validity of the court's conclusions.
Apparently, the beneficiary in Burne, like the one in a 1964
Texas case,4" made the claim that the effect of the ninety-day
clause was to encourage the beneficiary to deny the accident
victim maximum medical care. Unlike the earlier decision, however, Burne directly confronted that implication of the provision.
The court pointed to the significant advances made in medical
technology since the ninety-day provision first appeared in
accident-insurance policies. ° Modern medical technology often
makes it possible to prolong life indefinitely, if only at its most
basic level. Thus, the physician and the family of an accident
victim have the burden of deciding when life must be terminated
in a hopeless case. The court determined that the decision of
whether or not to disconnect the life-sustaining devices should
not be hampered by the prospect that prolonging the insured's
life would mean the forfeiture of accidental death benefits.
Thus, grave, ethical issues, which might arise in a situation
in which the insured is critically injured in an accident, led the
court to conclude the ninety-day provision violated public policy.'" The grave issues to which the court referred were those
concerning euthanasia. The court commented in a footnote that
the purpose of its opinion was "not to introduce this controversy
into the area of life insurance policies but to forestall it. ' 52
Understandably, the Burne court would want to avoid a dis48. Id. at 221-23, 301 A.2d at 801-02. It is difficult to pinpoint the public policies the
Burne court thought were violated because the decision does not discuss them individually. As has been suggested below, the violations which the court had in mind might have
been defects analogous to the introduction of wager into the insurance policy and the
unconscionability of the clause. See pp. 159-60 infra.
49.
also p.
50.
51.
52.

Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W:2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See
153 & note 47 supra.
451 Pa. at 221-22, 301 A.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 222, 301 A.2d at 801.
Id. n.3.
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cussion of euthanasia, which raises controversial legal issues and
presents moral and ethical questions beyond the ordinary competence of a court. Even if it were settled that turning off the respirator in a hopeless case is an act of euthanasia, the question of
criminal liability of the doctor and the family of the accident
victim still remains.-3 Apart from those unsettled questions, an
additional consideration arises in the insurance context of the
Burne case-whether the act amounts to an intervening cause,
bringing the death within the exclusions of the accidental death
policy. The intervening cause problem is tied inextricably to the
unsettled issues surrounding euthanasia. 4 Thus, in skirting the
issue of euthanasia, the Burne court omitted reference to the issue
of intervening cause.
Besides an avowed purpose to forestall the introduction of
the controversy of euthanasia into insurance law, other considerations led the Burne court to invalidate the time-limitation provision. However, as mentioned above, the other public policy considerations merged indistinguishably in the opinion. Because of
the court's approach, one can only speculate about what specific
public policy considerations actually entered into the court's deliberations. At any rate, it is submitted that the policy considerations discussed in the remaining portion of this article could have
been considered by the court.
The argument that the effect of the operation of the ninetyday provision was to introduce the element of wager into the
insurance policy55 could have entered into the court's reasoning.
53. No common law court has ever convicted a doctor for turning off the respirator
sustaining the life of a suffering terminal patient. Likewise, there apparently have been
no instances in which a family member has been tried and convicted for authorizing such

an act. Nevertheless, the legal consequences for both the physician and the family member
conceivably could be prosecution and conviction for murder. There have been proposals
for the legalization of certain forms of euthanasia, one of which is classifying the act of
shutting off the respirator as an act of omission rather than of commission. However, none
of the proposals has received any acceptance in the courts. Fletcher, ProlongingLife, 42
WASH. L. REv. 999 (1967). See also Symposium-The Medical, Moral and Legal Implications of Recent MedicalAdvances, 13 VIL. L. REv. 732 (1968), for discussion of the ethical
and scientific issues as well as the legal problems surrounding euthanasia.
54. If the insured were already "technically" dead when the plug of the respirator was
pulled, then perhaps the act would not be an intervening cause. However, the medical or
technical definition of death might not be the legal definition.
55. According to Professor Corbin: "[Elvery insurance contract is aleatory in character performable upon an uncertain event, and is one in which one of the parties will get
something for nothing. The reason that it is not a wager is that it is a contract for the
transfer of an existing risk and is not one that creates a wholly new risk." 6A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1482, at 642-43 (1962).
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Courts generally require that the owner or beneficiary of a life
insurance policy have an insurable interest,56 arising out of the
7
relationship of the policy owner or beneficiary with the insured.
If the requisite insurable interest is lacking, the insurance policy
may be declared "void as a wagering contract against public policy, which condemns gambling speculation upon human life.""8
The policy against wagering insurance contracts is based on the
possibility that the beneficiary will be motivated to bring about
the insured contingent, the death of the insured. It is generally
recognized that a wife has an insurable interest in the life of her
husband, based on both a financial and personal relationship. 0
Nonetheless, it could be argued that in Burne the wife's insurable
interest in her husband, based on the financial relationship, was
eliminated by the operation of the time-limitation clause. Because the condition of the insured was hopeless anyway, the prospect of forfeiting the double indemnity benefits could have been
enough of an inducement to the beneficiary to deny the insured
maximum medical care and thereby cut short his life."
56. See generally 1 G. RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE §§ 92-102, at 369-406 (5th ed. W.
Freedman 1952). It is not in every situation that the beneficiary will be required to have
an insurable interest. Nevertheless, the same policy reasons underlying the requirement
that the policy owner have an insurable interest also support a like requirement for the
beneficiary in most situations. But see p. 157 & note 63 infra.
57. An insurable interest in life insurance exists in two different types of relationships: (1) a financial relationship (a wife's procuring of life insurance on her husband to
guard against financial loss in the event of his death) and (2) a relationship based on some
societal or familial ties, such as husband and wife. Vukowich, InsurableInterest: When
It Must Exist in Property and Life Insurance, 7 WLLAMImTrE L.J. 1, 5 (1971).
58. Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 105, 28 S.E. 200, 201
(1897). "Gambling or wagering of any kind, particularly in the guise of an aleatory contract like insurance, is deemed to be contrary to good morals and conducive to harmful
and economic consequences." RicHARDS, supra note 56, § 65, at 329.
59. Vukowich, supra note 57, at 8. Also, since wagering often causes the wagerer to
effect unnaturally the occurrence of the insured event, it can be argued that it leads to
dishonesty or stealth. Id.
60. E.g., Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 110, 28 S.E. 200, 203
(1897); cf. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 20-21, 135 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1964),
in which the wife's insurable interest in her husband was denied by the court because she
took out the policy on his life without his consept.
61. The beneficiary would probably make the following argument to show how the
operation of the time-limitation clause denies an insurable interest in a situation in which
the insured is certain to die of accidental injuries: The beneficiary still has a familial
relation to the insured. However, the financial interest in the insured's continued existence no longer exists. Not only are the medical expenses to keep the insured alive overwhelming, but the continued costly medical care will result in the forfeiture of the double
indemnity benefits. Since the insured is suffering hopelessly, is unaware of anything
around him, and is certain to die even with the extraordinary medical techniques em-
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The Burne court, however, avoided mention of the terms
"wager" and "insurable interest." In addition to the absence of
reference to wager in the opinion, the settled law concerning life
insurance leads one to conclude that the Burne court did not view
the provision as a wagering clause. 2 The general rule is that
everyone has an insurable interest in his own life; one can obtain
valid insurance on his own life and make it payable to whomever
he wishes, even if the beneficiary has no insurable interest in the
insured.63 Furthermore, it is settled that an insurable interest
must exist only at the time a life insurance policy is effected and
not at the time of death.64 If the argument were made that the
beneficiary's insurable interest in the insured was extinguished
by the operation of the time-limitation clause, the counter argument would be that the insured, as the policy owner, still had an
insurable interest in his own life. The beneficiary's lack of insurable interest in the insured therefore would not make the ninetyday provision a wagering clause. Commentators have proposed
that there be a requirement for an insurable interest both at the
inception of the policy and at death because such a rule would
provide a greater deterrence to homicide." Also, the requirement
that both the policy owner and the beneficiary have an insurable
interest at the time of death would have the same desirable effect.
However, there is no decisional support for either of the proposals.
Finally, there is an additional characteristic of the wager analysis
which makes it unlikely that the Burne court voided the ninetyday provision for this reason. Many authorities hold that only the
insurer may raise the defense of a lack of insurable interest to
defeat the claims of the beneficiary. 6 Even if the Burne court had
ployed, the absence of a financial interest in the insured's continued existence negatives
the still-existing familial interests. Thus, the beneficiary will be motivated to deny the
insured full medical care. In fact, it could be argued that even the familial interest will
result in the denial of extraordinary medical techniques; thus, the plug of the respirator
will be "mercifully" pulled. Such an argument regarding the time-limitation's denial of
the type of familial interest existing at the initiation of the policy, however, gets into all
the difficult legal and ethical issues which the Burne court tried to avoid in its decision.
62. See generally Vukowich, supra note 56.
63. Ellison Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 216 S.C. 475, 481, 58 S.E.2d 890,
892 (1950). Even though the donee beneficiary will be tempted to unlawfully terminate
the life insured, the law considers this to be of slight concern, "since the selection of the
beneficiary by the insured is, in ordinary cases, sufficient guaranty of the existence of such
good faith and confidence between them as will sufficiently protect the insured." VANCE,
supra note 6, § 31, at 189.
64. Vukowich, supra note 57, at 23.
65. Id. at 35-38.
66. VANCE, supra note 6, § 31, at 199.
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found that the beneficiary had standing to raise the issue, presumably the insurer could have argued that the beneficiary's lack
of insurable interest voided the entire insurance policy and not
just the time-limitation clause.
Nevertheless, Burne's analysis of this particular aspect of
public policy is similar to that used by courts declaring other
types of contract provisions to be unenforceable because they
tend to promote a result injurious to public welfare." As discussed
above, the operation of the ninety-day clause offered an inducement endangering the life of the accident victim. Courts have not
hesitated to hold illegal, and unenforceable, contracts that offered a financial inducement to jeopardize a person's life or
health." The Burne dissent claimed that before a contract can be
voided on public policy grounds the court must consider the intention of the parties at the time they bargained.6 9 However, other
courts have not viewed the invalidation of such illegal contracts
as dependent upon the intention of the parties when they entered
the bargain. °
One could argue, therefore, that Burne relied upon a basic
contract principle regarding illegal contracts 7' to hold that the
ninety-day provision contravened public policy and was unenforceable. Burne's analysis of that public policy element, however, lacked any evidential basis for its premises. Therein may lie
a weakness which could make the decision less likely to be followed in other jurisdictions. A court taking the bold step of overturning a contract provision on public policy grounds will obviously have its decision scrutinized. 72 When other courts examine the Burne decision, they will note it furnished no empirical
evidence that medical technology had improved to such an extent
that life could be prolonged indefinitely. The court also did not
67. Id. § 48, at 291.

68. See

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 591 (1932).

69. 451 Pa. at 230-33, 301 A.2d at 805-06.
70. See CORBIN, supra note 55, § 1375, at 10-19. As the concurring opinion points out:
"Bargains providing financial inducements for a,person to voluntarily accept restrictions
on one's marriage, divorce, sexual relationships and other domestic relationships have
frequently been stricken as opposed to public policy." 451 Pa. at 227, 301 A.2d at 804,
citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §§ 581-89 (1932). Thus, the Burne court is justified in
striking the provision as a violation of public policy even if the insured could have foreseen, and voluntarily agreed to, the possible consequences of the time-limitation clause
when he entered into the insurance contract.
71. See CoRsN, supra note 55, § 1375, at 10-19.
72. Id. at 11.
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support with empirical evidence its premise that beneficiaries of
an insurance policy actually would be motivated to withhold full
medical care from the insured to avoid the foifeiture of accidental
death benefits.13 The court in Burne apparently based its premises on common knowledge (as courts are permitted to do). 74 Nevertheless, the lack of evidential basis for its essential premises
makes the decision susceptible to the dissent's criticism that the
court usurped a function of the Pennsylvania insurance commissioner ."
The unfairness of the ninety-day clause might have been
another reason the court rejected it. Nevertheless, what was said
above about the possible wagering aspect of the clause is equally
applicable to this other element of public policy. Since terms
such as "equity" and "fairness" were avoided, the reliance on
considerations of fairness was only implied in the decision's language. The court said the clause presented a "gruesome paradox"
by permitting recovery in the case of an accident victim who died
instantly but denying recovery for the death of an accident victim
"who endures the agony of prolonged illness, suffers longer, and
necessitates greater expense by his family in the hopes of sustaining life even momentarily beyond the ninety day period." 7 Such
an effect, the court said, "offends the basic concepts and fundamental objectives of life insurance . . . 77
Burne's description of the "gruesome paradox" of the clause
resembles the claims of unfairness made by beneficiaries and
rejected summarily by the courts in some of the earlier decisions. 78 There have been instances in which courts have stretched
contract principles to avoid the harsh application of insurance
policy provisions, especially in cases involving a question of
73. The dissent criticized the majority holding for the lack of evidence for its premises. 451 Pa. at 236-37, 301 A.2d at 808.
74. CoRBiN, supra note 55, § 1375, at 11.
75. 451 Pa. at 238, 301 A.2d at 809. See p. 151 & note 28 supra.
76. 451 Pa. at 222, 301 A.2d at 801-02.
77. Id., 301 A.2d at 802. The dissent was especially critical of this conclusion of the
majority and said it thought the fundamental objective of life insurance was actually "to
provide a fund of money payable upon one's death to a designated beneficiary in accordance with terms and conditions and for the considerations mutually agreed upon between
the insurer and the purchaser .

. . ."

Id. at 236, 301 A.2d at 808. On the other hand, it

might be argued that the dissent's definition was too limited. As pointed out above, life
insurance is usually procured to guard against financial loss. See note 57 supra. Financial
loss may be at its greatest in the Burne situation where the insured lingers beyond the
time-limitation period because the increased medical expenses are offset only by the face
amount of the policy.
supra.
152-53Commons,
78. See
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whether a loss came within the exceptions and exclusions of the
policy." Nevertheless, the courts in those cases disclaimed any
reliance on equitable considerations and based their decisions on
the principle that ambiguous terms should be construed strictly
against the insurer."' This principle of construction might have
been misused in that the courts read ambiguity into unambiguous terms to arrive at just results. 8 Yet, by relying on this
principle of construction, the courts could point to their adherence to the rule that an insurance contract should be interpreted
to conform with the intention of the parties. In Burne no claim
was made that the ninety-day clause was ambiguous. Furthermore, the intention of the parties was not an issue in the majority
opinion. Thus, if Burne placed any weight on the unfairness of the
provision, it not only ignored the rule "that equitable considerations cannot be deemed sufficient to overcome contractual provisions" ' 2 but also went beyond even those cases in which contract
principles were misused to reach equitable results.
If it could be shown that the Burne court used an unconscionability analysis, then perhaps its consideration of the unfairness
of the ninety-day clause could be reconciled with the conflicting
precedents discussed above. No other case has dealt with the
possible unconscionability of the provision. However, if Burne
treated the unconscionability issue, the decision would be in line
with authority approving invalidation of other types of contractual provisions contrary to public policy. According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the determination of whether
a contract term is or is not unconscionable is to be made "in the
light of its setting, purpose and effect." 3 The Restatement implies that the analytical structure of unconscionability should
focus on two types of abuses-one relating to the contract formation, or procedural abuse, and the other to the substantive unfairness of the contract." The prevailing view is that a contract term
79. E.g., Perry v. Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 103 Mass. 242 (1869).
80. See Dauer, note 3 supra. The Burne court also based its invalidation of the
waiver-of-premium exception on the same principle. 451 Pa. at 226, 301 A.2d at 804.
81. Regarding the majority's finding of ambiguity in the waiver-of-premium exception, see the discussion in note 3 supra.
82. Westenhover v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 27 So. 2d 391, 393 (La. App. 1946).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 234, comment a at 528 (Tentative Drafts
Nos. 1-7, 1973). The particular policy outlined by the Restatement "also overlaps with
rules which render particular bargains or terms illegal." Id.
84. Spanogle, Analyzing UnconscionabilityProblems, 117 U. PA. L. Rlv. 931, 932
(1969). See also Comment, 114 U. PA. L. Rzv. 998 (1966), treating unconscionability under
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss1/6

42

Campbell and McCrae: Comments

19741

ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS

must be characterized by both procedural and substantive unconscionability to be overturned as unconscionable.85 Thus, to determine whether Burne properly approached the issue of the fairness
of the ninety-day clause, one must examine the language of the
decision for evidence that the court considered both substantive
and procedural abuse.
There is language in the decision to the effect that the operation of the ninety-day provision was substantvely unconscionable. As pointed out above, 6 the court discussed the "gruesome
paradox" created by the clause. It concluded the provision was
oppressively unreasonable because it served as a trap for the insured and a means of escape for the company in case of loss."7 The
court also discussed the unreasonableness of the purpose of the
clause, which would point to the provision's substantive unconscionability.8 8 There was no dispute in Burne that the death of the
insured was accidental. Thus, since the purpose behind the clause
was to delineate purely accidental deaths, the court concluded
the clause could not reasonably be applied to the factual situation
89
and should be disregarded.
Absent from the opinion, however, is evidence that the court
considered procedural unconscionability. The dissent pointed
out, with some justification concerning the unfairness issue, that
the majority should have considered the intention of the parties
at the time they entered the contract. The intention of the parties is one of the factors a court must consider in examining the
setting of a contract term to determine if the element of procedural unconscionability exists. 9'
However, proof that the insured intended to accept the inclusion of the ninety-day clause, fully aware of its possible consequences, would not necessarily defeat a finding of procedural unconscionability. If the court had treated the unequal bargaining
position of the parties, the insured's acceptance of the oppressive
policy term might have made no difference so far as its unenforceability is concerned.9 2 Like the earlier decisions concerning
85. Comment, supra note 84, at 1002.
86. See p. 159 supra.
87. 451 Pa. at 225, 301 A.2d at 803.
88. See Spanogle, supra note 84, at 958: "Courts must weigh the legitimate interests
of the drafting party against identifiable public policies that the terms may contravene."
89. See pp. 152-53 supra.
90. See 451 Pa. at 230-31, 301 A.2d at 806-07.
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 83.
92. See Comment, supra note 84, at'999.
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the fairness of a time-limitation clause, however, Burne did not
discuss the issue of adhesion. The court thus ignored one of the
essential bases upon which other courts have relied to determine
certain contractual provisions were unconscionable.
Although most cases indicate some type of procedural abuse
is necessary, other decisions have applied a result-oriented definition of unconscionability.93 Therefore, when the contract term is
particularly harsh as in Burne, the claimant would have to show
little or no procedural abuse. Nevertheless, an adhesion analysis
would have been a natural approach for the Burne court since the
characteristic of adhesion is particularly apparent in insurance
contracts.9 If an adhesion analysis had been used, the court's
invalidation of the ninety-day clause on equitable grounds might
have provided a greater impetus for other courts to take a similar
course of action.
After concluding that public policy considerations compelled
holding the ninety-day clause unenforceable, the court then made
the questionable assertion that there was no persuasive decisional
authority for upholding the provision. 5 The court cited
Sidebothom v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,"5 decided thirty
years earlier, as the single case relied upon by the trial court in
granting the insurer's request for summary judgment. The Burne
court pointed out that Sidebothom could be factually distinguished as presenting causation problems. However, absent in
the Burne decision is the admission that the ninety-day provision
was still the crucial basis for Sidebothom's holding that the beneficiary had not stated a cause of action.97 Other decisions which
Burne cited as leading cases and distinguished as involving "an
inherent uncertainty as to whether death would in fact ensue"98
also were decided by the courts primarily because the timelimitation clause precluded recovery. Furthermore, the Burne
majority apparently overlooked other leading cases in which a
time-limitation was upheld even though there was no dispute
that the cause of death was an accident and that from the moment of the accident death was certain to ensue. 9
93. Spanogle, supra note 84, at 949.
94. See p. 150-51 supra.
95. 401 Pa. at 223, 301 A.2d at 802.
96. 339 Pa. 124, 14 A.2d 131 (1940).
97. Id. at 127.28, 14 A.2d at 132.
98. 451 Pa. at 223 n.4, 301 A.2d at 802 n.4.
99. See cases cited note 40 supra.
100. 451 Pa. at 224, 301 A.2d at 802.
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This less than accurate assessment of the decisional authority approving the validity of the ninety-day provision is certainly
subject to criticism. The court's treatment of the inapplicability
of the clause to the factual situation in Burne is similarly defective. The court held the inapplicability of the clause brought into
operation the "well settled" principle "that if a provision in an
insurance policy cannot reasonably be applied to a certain factual
situation it should be disregarded."'' 0 The authority cited by the
court for this "sound rule" was an 1884 Pennsylvania case,
Grandin v. Rochester German Insurance Co."' That case, however, is no real authority for the application of such a rule in
Burne since the court in Grandin held the disputed provision
inapplicable only after it had determined the intent of the parties
at the time they entered the bargain.102 In Burne, the intent of the
parties was not an issue. Thus, it appears that Burne manufactured this "sound rule"; a more obvious example of creative use
of precedent would be difficult to find.'
Even in light of the discussion above, the policy considerations in Burne seem compelling. Criticism has recently been directed toward the insurance industry because of dissatisfaction
with certain results when basic contract law is applied to the
policy. 04 Thus, the result reached in Burne might encourage
courts in other jurisdictions to look more closely at public policy
issues when examining the validity of the time-limitation clause.
If the court's analysis had been more adequate in several
respects, other courts probably would be more inclined to follow
Burne. In its examination of the public policy issues, the decision
should have specified exactly what public policy issues were being
considered and should have treated them individually. Such an
approach would have eliminated the ambiguities discussed
above. The court should have examined the issue of euthanasia
101. 107 Pa. 26 (1884).
102. Id. at 35. The Grandin court said:
[W]here it is attempted to defeat a recovery upon the ground that under one
of its conditions the policy is void, we are driven to an examination of the
character of the condition and the reason upon which it is founded, in order to
ascertain whether it would have been in the contemplation of the parties when
the contract of insurance was made.

Id.
103. The inapplicability of a contract provision to the factual situation, which might
indicate the term's unreasonableness, may be, however, one of the factors in determining
the substantive unconscionability of the contract. See p. 161 supra.
104. See Note, supra note 10, at 635.
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under an analysis similar to that used by courts in treating illegal
contracts. With that type of traditional analytical framework, the
decision would have had more respectability to other courts. Furthermore, the court might have furnished empirical evidence for
its premises to support its conclusions. The court also by-passed
the issue of unconscionability; it could have tackled the element
of unfairness by discussing, both substantive and procedural
abuses. Even though other courts have been hesitant to apply an
adhesion analysis in this area of life insurance, the use of such an
analytical structure by the court would have put the issue of
unconscionability into sharper focus. Moreover, since the court
did not have the excuse of construing an ambiguous contract
provision to hold the ninety-day clause invalid, the use of an
adhesion analysis would have made the decision less susceptible
to the criticism that the court was relying on equitable considerations to rewrite the insurance contract for the parties. Finally, the
court should have avoided the manipulation of the reasoning in
decisions it cited which had only tenuous applicability to the
question in Burne.
STEPHEN
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